The economics of Aave’s GHO versus MakerDAO’s DAI savings rate

GHO and DAI are both crypto-collateralized stablecoins, but their revenue flows differ fundamentally. GHO is native to the Aave lending protocol, where interest rates are defined by the Aave DAO. Repaid interest on GHO borrows redirects to the DAO rather than asset suppliers, generating additional revenue for the protocol. In contrast, DAI relies on stability fees paid by borrowers to cover system costs like liquidations. These fees calibrate supply and demand around the $1 target without directly paying holders. The structural split means GHO functions as a debt instrument that funds the Aave ecosystem, while DAI operates as a collateral-backed currency with organic market-based growth. I find this distinction critical because it dictates who captures the yield from the underlying assets.

Revenue mechanics and holder incentives

The Aave v3 Ethereum deployment is the largest revenue generator among its networks. Borrow Interest constitutes the primary income source, with smaller amounts coming from flashloan and liquidation fees. Daily revenue spikes often correlate with increased liquidation activity. For GHO specifically, the fixed oracle price ensures transparency, preventing arbitrary changes to the peg. Borrowers who stake AAVE in the Safety Module receive discounts on the borrowing rate for every 100 GHO borrowed. This discount model is interchangeable and can be redesigned by the DAO if needed. The first facilitator is the Aave V3 Ethereum Pool, which allows users to mint GHO against collateral assets. A second facilitator, the FlashMint module, facilitates arbitrage and liquidations by providing instant liquidity. Over time, GHO is expected to expand to other blockchains based on community voting.

DAI holds a significantly larger supply at 4.5 billion units compared to GHO’s 699 million. Both tokens maintain a peg near one dollar, though DAI trades slightly higher at $0.9998. The stability fee mechanism in DAI covers operational risks, whereas GHO’s interest payments fund the Aave DAO’s treasury. I would skip any narrative suggesting these two compete directly for retail savings, as neither pays interest to passive holders. The "savings rate" concept applies only when users actively lend or stake within DeFi protocols, not merely by holding the token. If you hold GHO, your return depends on the specific DeFi application you deploy it in, such as lending or yield farming. The coin itself pays nothing; the activity does.

Regulatory context and capital flow

Regulatory frameworks increasingly distinguish between payment stablecoins and yield-generating products. The GENIUS Act prohibits direct interest payments to holders of permitted payment stablecoins, treating them as digital cash rather than investment vehicles. This creates a structural imbalance since three-month U.S. Treasuries yield around 3.6%, while traditional savings accounts pay significantly less. Capital may migrate offshore or into synthetic structures like Ethena’s USDe, which generates yield through delta-neutral strategies involving crypto collateral and perpetual futures. Such products fall outside the definition of payment stablecoins, occupying regulatory gray areas. Banks argue that yield-bearing stablecoins could trigger deposit outflows, weakening lending capacity. However, consumers already have access to money markets and high-yield savings accounts, so stablecoins simply extend access into crypto-native environments. The CLARITY Act compromise attempts to ban "yield" while allowing "activity-based rewards," a distinction that is functionally meaningless in practice. As long as issuers generate income from reserves, pressure will persist to share that value with users. Does the label matter if the economic function remains identical?